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One of welfare reform’s most significant consequences is the devolution of policy-making
authority from the federal government and states to local governments and frontline
workers. What is perhaps less often appreciated is that devolution of authority to state
governments has been accompanied by a significant decentralization of policy-making
authority within states. As a result, prior research has not given sufficient attention to
local political context as a factor shaping program implementation. This article examines
the effect of local political values on the use of sanctions to penalize welfare recipients.
Analyzing administrative data from the Florida Department of Children and Families for
over 60,000 welfare clients, we find that there is a statistically significant amount of local
variation in sanctioning rates across the state of Florida, even after controlling welfare
clients’ characteristics. Local sanctioning patterns are systematically related to selected
characteristics of local communities, including their ideological orientations.

In 1996, the federal government made large-scale changes to income
assistance, replacing the entitlement program Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) program. Under TANF, state policy makers have significant freedom to craft their own approaches to public assistance (Nathan 1996). It is now generally acknowledged that states responded to
this new freedom in diverse ways that systematically reflect their social,
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economic, and political characteristics (Soss et al. 2001; Gais and Weaver
2002; Fellowes and Rowe 2004).
What is perhaps less often appreciated about welfare reform under
TANF is that devolution of authority from the federal government to
state governments has been accompanied by a significant decentralization of policy-making authority within states (Gainsborough 2003).
The TANF program’s emphasis on flexible services and sanctioning
virtually ensures that decision making is pushed downward to local implementers, including case managers, who serve as the primary streetlevel bureaucrats in the new world of welfare service delivery (Ridzi
2004; Riccucci 2005; Lurie 2006). However, many states further expand
local discretion in TANF implementation by pursuing second-order devolution; that is, some states formally transfer control to county governments or local governance boards (Nathan and Gais 1999). Decentralization is further enhanced by the growing reliance on contract
agencies for service delivery (Dias and Maynard-Moody 2007). Although
there is little systematic data on the extent of second-order devolution
in welfare policy, a recent study estimates that by 2001, at least 20 states
engaged in either “slight” or “significant” amounts (Gainsborough 2003,
607–8).
Advocates of welfare decentralization argue that devolution promotes
TANF goals by fostering innovation and flexibility in meeting client
needs (see, e.g., Eggers and O’Leary 1995). This is critical to TANF’s
success, supporters assert, because employment barriers are most effectively identified and addressed by local decision makers who best understand the needs of their poor and the resources available to them
in the community (Weissert 2000; Gainsborough 2003). However, the
increase in local discretion that accompanies decentralization enables
local policy makers, agency managers, and frontline workers to use their
discretion for other purposes, including the advancement of political
goals. Indeed, the collective findings from a large body of research
suggest that implementation outcomes often reflect the political values
of local policy makers, agency staff, and the local community (e.g.,
Lipsky 1978; Goggin et al. 1990). In light of this research, one might
expect that the use of local discretion under TANF is driven as much
by the local political culture as by the unique needs of the low-income
residents in the community.
Many studies evaluate the effects of decentralization in welfare reform
by examining how implementation may be affected by dynamic interactions among incentives, organizational forms, cultures, and welfare
agency personnel (Meyers, Riccucci, and Lurie 2001; Ewalt and Jennings
2004). Although most of these studies find that local events and conditions affect implementation, they give little consideration to the roles
of ideology and local political context. This article contributes to the
literature by examining the effect of local political values on one of the
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most consequential aspects of welfare reform: the use of sanctions to
penalize recipients who fail to fulfill TANF requirements. Although a
number of studies effectively examine the determinants of sanctioning,
they have almost exclusively focused on client characteristics and ignored
the possibility that variation in sanctioning occurs due to the effects of
the local political environment (for a review, see Meyers et al. [2006]; for
an example, see Wu et al. [2006]). The analysis that follows addresses two
specific questions. First, to what extent has welfare decentralization led
to variation in the use of TANF sanctioning across local jurisdictions
operating under the same sanction policy? Second, are local differences
in sanctioning solely a function of variation in client characteristics, or is
the use of sanctioning also influenced by the local implementation environment and, especially, by the local political context?
These questions are answered by examining sanctioning outcomes in
the state of Florida, which stands as a leader in welfare decentralization
and second-order devolution. The analysis is based on administrative
data for over 60,000 TANF clients in Florida. These data are used to
examine how individual sanction outcomes are related to individual
client traits, local social and economic conditions, and the local political
environment.

Welfare Reform and Sanctioning under TANF
Sanctions have long been used by caseworkers to encourage compliance
with state welfare rules. Over the past decade, however, sanctions have
come to play a more prominent role in welfare implementation; compared to the AFDC program, the TANF program compels clients to face
stricter work requirements, narrower exemption criteria, a greater number of behaviors subject to sanction, and stronger penalties for noncompliance (Hasenfeld and Powell 2004). Most analysts agree that sanctions are a linchpin of the successful effort to transform welfare from
a system focused on providing cash benefits (AFDC) to one focused on
the promotion of work norms (TANF; see Pavetti et al. 2004).
Federal legislation requires that TANF clients be subject to a reduction
in benefits for failure to follow a number of different program rules
(U.S. Public Law 104-193 [1996]). Under TANF, states have a range of
options in determining exactly how benefits should be reduced. The
most important of these options enable states to decide (1) whether to
reduce the benefit for the eligible adult, all adults in a family, or the
entire family and (2) whether and when to impose a partial or full
reduction of benefits. Seventeen states rely on the strictest combination
of these choices, enforcing what is referred to as an “immediate fullfamily sanction” (Pavetti, Derr, and Hesketh 2003, 2). In these states,
the entire TANF family is immediately removed from the TANF rolls at
the first instance of noncompliance. Eighteen states use a “gradual full-
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family sanction,” which potentially has the same effect, but it is applied
only after continued noncompliance (Pavetti et al. 2003, 3). The remaining states enforce what is known as a “partial sanction,” which
results in a partial reduction of benefits (usually affecting only the portion of the grant awarded to adults; Pavetti et al. [2003], 2).
Studies using a variety of dependent variables suggest that sanctioning
has important effects on the size and characteristics of the TANF caseload. In one of the first relevant studies in the TANF era, Heidi Goldberg
and Liz Schott (2000) estimate that between 1997 and 1999, nearly
500,000 families lost benefits due to sanctions. This represents a quarter
of the caseload reduction for that period. Other studies that focus on
selected states also find the incidence of sanctioning is quite high (for
a review, see Pavetti et al. [2004]). Given these estimates, it is not surprising that many state-level studies find high caseload reductions
among states with strict policies. States with the strictest sanctioning
policies experienced a caseload reduction that is as much as 25 percent
greater than those reported by states with the least stringent policies
(Rector and Youssef 1999; Mead 2000).
Several studies use surveys of TANF recipients or state administrative
data to examine the characteristics of sanctioned families. The findings
converge on the conclusion that sanctioned clients tend to exhibit the
characteristics of long-term welfare recipients (Pavetti et al. 2003; Wu
et al. 2006). Studies find that the probability of being sanctioned is
related to a client’s race, marital status, age, family size, education level,
and job experience (Born, Caudill, and Cordero 1999; Koralek 2000;
Westra and Routely 2000; Mancuso and Lindler 2001; Hasenfeld, Ghose,
and Hillesland-Larson 2002; Kalil, Seefeldt, and Wang 2002). If the overall
incidence of sanctioning is also considered, it follows that sanctioning
practices greatly affect the characteristics of the TANF population.
The literature, however, pays surprisingly little attention to the decentralized implementation processes that are at the heart of welfare
reform. To be sure, there is some evidence that, within states, sanction
rates vary among locales with different social characteristics, political
environments (Keiser, Meuser, and Choi 2004), sanctioning philosophies, and case processing procedures (Maloy et al. 1998; Born et al.
1999; Koralek 2000). These few studies notwithstanding, the consequences of dispersed local implementation remain a blind spot in understanding sanction processes and outcomes (Pavetti et al. 2003).

Devolution, Discretion, and the Implementation of TANF
Sanctions
The central argument here is that welfare reform has been accompanied
by a significant and, in recent decades, unprecedented devolution of
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policy-making discretion to local actors. Second-order devolution produces significant and systematic variation in the use of TANF sanctions
by local actors within states. The variation reflects the exercise of discretion by two sets of actors in the TANF implementation process: (1)
local TANF policy makers, whose discretion in TANF implementation
has increased significantly in many states due to second-order devolution, and (2) agency administrators and their case managers, who are
charged with the responsibility of monitoring client behavior and initiating sanctions if TANF rules are violated.
Second-Order Devolution
In general, second-order devolution takes two forms. The most common
form is exemplified in the actions of 14 states, which devolve policy
authority to county governments (Gainsborough 2003). Ten of these
states previously shared AFDC administrative duties with counties. This
prior sharing of authority may have encouraged policy makers in these
states to devolve policy authority for TANF down to the county level.
These 14 states vary in the types of duties they pass down to counties. In
states with the greatest amount of second-order devolution, counties gain
substantial control over spending (through block grants). They enjoy
broad discretion over the use of TANF work requirements, sanctions, time
limits, and one-time diversion payments (Gainsborough 2003).
Welfare policies in six other states exemplify the second form of second-order devolution. These states grant policy authority to local or
regional governing boards rather than to counties. In all six states,
welfare services have been linked to state workforce development programs that operate under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA; U.S.
Public Law 105-220 [1998]). Welfare and workforce development programs are implemented through one-stop centers run by public or private organizations, including for-profit providers, that are contracted by
regional workforce boards (RWBs) to administer these programs. These
boards are mandated by WIA. Their membership comprises both public
and private officials. The exact rules for board composition vary from
state to state, but most of the six states require that at least half of the
board’s members come from the local business community (Gainsborough 2003). These boards have power over TANF policy, but the extent
of that power varies. According to Juliet Gainsborough (2003), Florida,
Michigan, and Texas cede significantly greater amounts of authority to
their RWBs than do Arkansas, Tennessee, and Utah.
Agency and Caseworker Discretion
Frontline agencies and their staff have always had broad discretion in
implementing welfare policy. This discretion has changed under TANF
because the program expanded the number of rules governing client
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behavior and the proportion of clients to which these rules must now
be applied. Whether this represents an increase in discretion for either
the management of agencies or their case managers is not clear. Agencies must implement policy consistent with its stated objectives; agencies
contracted to provide services must fulfill the terms of their contracts.
Managers, however, can find different ways to structure agency operations to achieve program objectives and meet performance goals (Ridzi
2004; Riccucci 2005; Lurie 2006). Decentralization can enhance this
sort of discretion. Decentralization can also increase variation across
organizations, as agencies vary in their capacity to implement policy
competently.
Within agencies, caseworkers can exercise additional discretion (Lipsky 1980). Three sources of constraint operate on caseworkers but in
less than definitive ways. First, supervision may be used to limit or guide
caseworker discretion. Under welfare reform, such supervision may have
increased in states such as Florida, where state-of-the-art management
information systems facilitate monitoring of caseworkers and their clients
(Shaw et al. 2006). Caseworkers, however, rarely operate under the direct
watch of supervisors (Prottas 1979; Lipsky 1980). Workers often handle
cases that are too complex and idiosyncratic to fit neatly under a supervisor’s a priori directive, and they process cases at rates that make continual consultation impractical (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003).
Second, administrative rules place broad limits on caseworkers, but
such rules cannot be designed to cover all conceivable situations, nor
can a rule “itself step forward to claim its own instance” (Hart 1961,
123). Choices must be made about how and when to apply a given rule,
and as the number of rules grows, so too grows the scope of frontline
decision making. Rather than eliminating discretion, “a profusion of
rules can lead to greater freedom because . . . the bureaucrat must
choose which rules are appropriate in the present [case]” (Feldman
1992, 166; see also Lipsky 1980, 14).
Third, program clients may create a possible check on caseworker
discretion because clients have the potential to use formal or informal
means to limit decisions contrary to their interests. Here again, however,
theory and evidence suggest that client action is a weak constraint.
Political economy approaches to social work theory argue that welfare
clients occupy a dependent position in a relationship defined by unequal
control of power resources (Hasenfeld 1987). To be sure, clients are
active participants in welfare interactions, and they do what they can to
subtly influence outcomes, but field research suggests that welfare clients
feel a keen sense of dependence on case managers; most clients report
that they avoid explicitly opposing caseworkers because such opposition
is seen as risky and ineffective (Soss 2000). Under the TANF program,
moreover, client benefits are no longer an entitlement, and clients have
lost some of the formal rights of appeal that they had under AFDC.
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These changes in policy seem likely to further weaken clients’ abilities
to impose limits on caseworker discretion (Mink 2002).
In light of the weakness of these constraints on both frontline agencies
and their caseworkers, it has become conventional wisdom that “discretion is inevitable” in street-level work (Maynard-Moody and Musheno
2000, 329). Decision making on the front lines (whether by agency
managers or their caseworkers) is widely recognized as a political process
that elaborates, transforms, and sometimes subverts the policy intentions
of lawmakers (Meier 2000). Such discretion may serve as an entry point
for unjust and unequal treatment or, alternatively, may permit the tailoring of more equitable and humane responses than the rules would
lead one to expect (Keiser 1999, 88–89). In either case, empirical research suggests that frontline discretion can produce wide variation even
in implementation of a federal program (Keiser and Soss 1998) or within
a highly centralized state welfare program (Riccucci 2005).
Despite such variation, it remains unclear whether agency manager
or caseworker discretion has increased under TANF and whether their
discretionary actions are affecting the implementation of sanctions. Yet
existing research appears to indicate that there is ample opportunity
for the exercise of discretion in sanction implementation (see Meyers
et al. 2006). This is clearly the case in states that delegate important
sanction policy decisions to local governing bodies and their provider
agencies. However, in the most comprehensive review of TANF sanction
research to date, LaDonna Pavetti and associates (2003, 6) find that
even when TANF offices operate under a common set of state guidelines,
local actors are able to exercise considerable discretion at a number of
key points in the sanction implementation process. Pavetti and associates
(2003) identify six examples of these key points in the sanctions process.
These key points occur when (1) informing clients of TANF rules and
the consequences for breaking them; (2) assessing client needs and
identifying those clients who are unable to participate in regular work
activities; (3) monitoring participation in required activities; (4) granting good-cause exceptions from participation in required work activities;
(5) initiating sanctions, including the method and timing of contact to
inform clients of an impending sanction; and (6) reengaging clients,
including the process for lifting a sanction.1
All of these points in the implementation process offer opportunities
for policy makers, agency managers, and caseworkers to exercise discretion. Yet, perhaps the most important moment of flexibility is that
at which these local actors interpret guidelines governing the application
of good-cause exceptions. The federal government requires that states
excuse single custodial parents from TANF work requirements if they
cannot find adequate child care. States also regularly excuse violations
of work requirements if the client lacks transportation or is ill. In addition, most states grant good-cause exceptions due to circumstances
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beyond the client’s control. Under second-order devolution, local policy
makers often determine the guidelines for deciding whether an exemption should be granted; local agency officials and their caseworkers
get to interpret how to apply those guidelines. Along with other opportunities for exercising discretion, good-cause exception policies offer
local policy makers and administrators significant influence over when
sanctions are applied. As a consequence of this local discretion, significant differences should occur in the implementation of sanctions across
local communities.
Politics and the Implementation of Sanctions
Theories of organizational culture emphasize that bureaucratic norms
and understandings should not be seen as autonomous, insider worldviews disconnected from their social milieus; rather, organizational cultures derive from, elaborate upon, and reflect the commonsense understandings of the broader communities in which they are embedded
(Feldman 1989; Herzfeld 1992; Martin 1992). Local environments may
affect organizational operations through democratic pressures, policy
makers may respond to local social conditions and needs, or officials
may share the political values of the community at large. Consistent
with this thinking, findings in several studies indicate that local public
policy implementation is influenced by the local political environment
(e.g., Goggin et al. 1990; Weissert 1994; Cho et al. 2005). This should
be no less true of local implementation of TANF sanctions, especially
in states that devolved significant authority to the local level.
The current study’s conceptualization of the political environment is
based on the classic liberal-conservative dimension, which state-level
studies of AFDC and TANF have repeatedly shown to be an important
determinant of support for welfare generosity (e.g., Fording 1997; Soss
et al. 2001; Barrilleaux, Holbrook, and Langer 2002). In states that assign
significant control to local entities, the political characteristics of local
environments might affect sanctioning rates in different ways through
the actions of three important local actors in the TANF implementation
process: case managers, local TANF policy makers and administrators,
and local advocacy groups.
First, local political culture may influence the sanctioning decisions
of case managers who share the political values of the community (Riccucci 2005). Survey research consistently finds that, compared to conservatives, liberals are generally more likely to attribute the causes of
poverty to structural explanations and are therefore more likely to support public assistance (Cook and Barrett 1992). Accordingly, one would
expect case managers in liberal environments to be more sympathetic
to TANF clients in interpreting and applying TANF rules (Morgen 2001).
Case managers in conservative environments, however, may be more
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likely to attribute poverty to individual shortcomings and therefore may
be less sympathetic to TANF clients who have fallen out of compliance
with TANF rules (Keiser et al. 2004). Thus, case managers in conservative
environments will be more willing to issue sanctions to TANF clients
than are case managers in liberal environments.
Second, in a decentralized policy-making environment, the political
orientations of local environments may generate differences among the
key decision makers of local agencies; those individuals are responsible
for interpreting state sanction policies and guiding the activities of local
case managers (Cho et al. 2005). County government officials in some
states may have a significant effect on sanctions policy. In states that
merged TANF and workforce development programs, the local workforce board, their contracted service providers, and the caseworkers in
such agencies may have significant influence in interpreting sanction
policies and over how the policies are implemented (Gainsborough
2003). It is expected that, in both settings, the degree of local conservatism will be positively related to stringency in the local operating
procedures that govern sanctioning. Local conservatism thus may also
lead to high sanction rates.
Third and finally, local political environments may influence sanction
rates through their effects on the presence and strength of local advocacy groups for the poor. Such groups may indirectly influence local
operating procedures through advocacy aimed at local TANF policy
makers. In some states, groups may exert influence by lobbying local
workforce boards or even by gaining seats on boards. In addition, contacts with liberal welfare advocacy groups provide welfare clients with
crucial sources of information and support (Handler 1992). Field research suggests that such support from advocacy groups can positively
affect client-worker interactions (Soss 2000). Thus, whether the effect
of the local political environment is exerted through the actions of local
policy makers, administrators and caseworkers, or advocacy groups, the
level of local conservatism should be positively related to local sanctioning rates.

Research and Design
Case Selection: Why Study Florida?
Florida is the setting for this study because it offers a superb opportunity
to examine relevant policy arrangements in a strong form (on the logic
of case selection, see Ragin [2000]; Yin [2003]). The state stands out
for three reasons.
First, Florida pursues one of the country’s strongest forms of secondorder devolution, blending transfers of authority to local actors, program integration, and widespread privatization. Since July 1, 2000, Flor-
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ida has provided TANF and WIA program services through one-stop
centers, and these programs are subject to integrated implementation.
A statewide public-private partnership called Workforce Florida Inc.
(WFI) oversees the workforce system. It delegates local authority for
these programs to RWBs that include representation from public and
private interests, including governmental offices and local employers.
These RWBs are responsible for strategic planning, policy development,
contracting, and oversight of local one-stop delivery systems. Frontline
services are provided by independent contractors. Regional workforce
boards award service contracts to public, nonprofit, and for-profit providers. The Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF), a conventional state agency, receives the federal TANF block grant and maintains responsibility for eligibility determination. Florida is otherwise a
standout among American states for its strong emphasis on local control
and privatization within an integrated work-oriented policy system (Botsko, Snyder, and Leos-Urbel 2001, 7).
Second, Florida provides an ideal case for studying sanctions. After
1996, Florida adopted “some of the strictest time limits and work requirements in the nation,” broadening the pool of clients subject to
sanctions by permitting “few possibilities for exemptions” (Botsko et al.
2001, 4). The penalties associated with sanctions in Florida are very
strict. Sanction policies vary across the states in the type of penalty
imposed, and Florida’s policies are among the strictest, resulting in an
immediate, full-family loss of TANF benefits as well as a reduction of
food stamp benefits to the fullest extent permitted by federal law (6).
Although cross-state comparisons are complicated by the diverse methods that states use to calculate sanction frequency, the current analysis
of Florida administrative data suggests that Florida employs sanctions
at an extremely high rate. Indeed, these data indicate that the Florida
DCF identified sanctions as the most common cause of TANF case closings in fiscal year 2003. Sanctions accounted for 31 percent of closings;
only 21 percent of cases were closed due to increased earnings.
Finally, Florida is an ideal choice for the current study because there
is much variation in the state’s local political environments. The local
economic and social conditions are similarly diverse in Florida. Florida’s
heavy emphasis on sanctioning, its decentralized approach to welfare
reform, and the variation in political, social, and economic characteristics combine to make the state an ideal setting for a study of the joint
effects of these characteristics on local sanction rates.
Data and Hypotheses
Event history analysis is used to examine which factors best predict the
imposition of sanctions. The sample consists of individual-level administrative data on all adults who received TANF in Florida between January
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2001 and December 2002. These data are supplemented with contextual
data that measure variation in the local implementing environment
across 66 of the state’s 67 counties.2 The combined data are used to
estimate event history models of TANF sanctioning. A dichotomous
dependent variable indicates whether a client was sanctioned. The independent variables include individual-level measures that capture client effects and county-level measures that capture community-context
effects.3 A number of variables control for variation in clients’ individual
characteristics. These variables include clients’ gender, age, marital
status, number of children, the age of the youngest child, wage income
(during the quarter prior to the observation), and education level. A
client’s race and ethnicity are controlled by identifying clients as belonging to one of three mutually exclusive racial and ethnic group
combinations: black, Hispanic, and white (non-Hispanic).4 Past research
indicates that these control variables are important predictors of sanctioning (Born et al. 1999; Koralek 2000; Mancuso and Lindler 2001;
Hasenfeld et al. 2002; Kalil et al. 2002; Wu et al. 2006).
The effects of the local political environment are captured through
a measure that conceptualizes local political ideology in traditional liberal-conservative terms. Estimating the relationship between ideology
and sanctioning at the local level poses a difficult challenge due to the
lack of a readily available measure of local ideology. In light of this, the
most common strategy in measuring local ideology focuses on county
partisanship as it is reflected in election returns (e.g., Keiser et al. 2004;
Cho et al. 2005). However, it is well known that partisanship tends to
be imperfectly related to political ideology (Miller 1999). Therefore,
this common strategy is likely to introduce measurement error into the
analysis. As an alternative to relying on local partisanship, this research
employs an original measure of local political ideology. Election results
are coded in each county for 18 ideologically relevant constitutional
amendments that appeared on the ballot throughout the entire state
between 1996 and 2004.5 Scores from a factor analysis of support for
all 18 amendments are used to create an index of county ideology. The
index is scaled to range from zero to one, with zero representing the
most liberal county (Gadsen) and one representing the most conservative county (Clay).
The measure of county conservatism is validated in two ways. First, it
is correlated with local partisanship. Validity is supported because the
simple correlation between the measure of county conservatism and a
measure of the average Republican vote share in recent presidential
elections is reasonably strong at 0.65 (p ! .05, N p 67).6 Second, the
measure is validated against measures of liberal-conservative self-identification. This is accomplished by merging results from two statewide
surveys that measure liberal-conservative self-identification at the individual level. County means across these survey responses are calculated
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Fig. 1.—Relationship between county conservatism index and average county conservative identification (survey based).

for the eight counties with at least 50 respondents represented in the
merged sample. The means are then correlated with the measure of
local conservatism.7 The relationship between the amendment-based
measure of county conservatism and the survey-based measure for these
eight counties is presented in figure 1. As the figure shows, the conservatism index corresponds well with the survey-based measure; the two
measures are correlated at 0.85. There is, thus, good evidence that the
measure of local ideology is valid.
The local racial context is also examined. Studies of racial politics
and policy outcomes often find that the racial context affects racially
relevant policy outcomes. Such effects are possibly due to a number of
factors, including a sense of racial threat felt by the white majority (Key
1949; Blalock 1967) and the effects of increased minority political power
(Keech 1968). Accordingly, the analyses include measures of the percentages of county residents who are black or Hispanic. If Lael Keiser
and associates’ (2004) results for Missouri offer any guidance, county
sanction rates will be inversely related to the share of county residents
who are nonwhite.
Several contextual measures capture the effects of local labor market
conditions on sanctions. First, if employment opportunities are relatively
numerous and attractive, TANF clients may be likely to work enough
hours to avoid falling out of compliance with TANF rules. Second, if
jobs are scarce or unattractive, local administrators and case managers
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may be sympathetic to TANF clients who fail to meet work requirements
and may resist stringent enforcement of TANF rules. The measures of
employment opportunities include the county unemployment rate, the
county poverty rate, the level of urbanization (as measured by total
county population), and the annual local wage in food service and
drinking establishments.8
A measure of the local TANF caseload is also included. This measures
the number of TANF-receiving adults per 100,000 county residents. As
the caseload size grows, all else equal, administrative pressures to reduce
the caseload may increase, resulting in a rise in sanctioning. But it also
is possible that if the caseload size increases relative to the number of
case managers, individual case managers may have less time to closely
monitor TANF clients for violations of rules, thus resulting in a decline
in the rate of sanctioning. Possible seasonal effects in sanctioning are
controlled by including dummy variables for each calendar month.

Results
Statewide Sanctioning Rates
Florida, along with many other states, employs immediate, full-family
sanctions to penalize clients who fall out of compliance with TANF
requirements. An inspection of statewide sanctioning data suggests that
sanctions are rather frequently enforced in Florida. The aggregate
trends in sanctioning over time are presented in figure 2. This figure
suggests that the number of sanctions issued each month was relatively
stable between 2000 and 2004. There are occasional fluctuations around
a mean of about 3,200 sanctions per month. Figure 2 provides some
perspective, displaying the number of TANF exits that occurred for
reasons unrelated to sanctions, or what may be called nonsanction exits.
Since 2001, nonsanction exits remained stable at an average of approximately 5,800 exits each month. This therefore implies that from
2000 through early 2004, more than one-third of all monthly TANF exits
in Florida were due to sanctions.
Although Florida appears to rely heavily on sanctions as a policy tool,
this conclusion ultimately rests on a comparison of sanction rates in
Florida with sanction rates in other states. This comparison is complicated by inconsistencies in the severity of sanction policies across states.
That is, in states that impose some form of partial sanction, TANF case
managers may be more willing than their counterparts in Florida to
issue a sanction because the consequences for TANF clients are less
severe than those faced by Florida TANF clients. Still, evidence suggests
that, despite the severity of Florida’s sanction policy (it is the strictest
allowed by federal law), sanction rates in Florida are quite high in comparison to those in other states. The most commonly reported sanction
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Fig. 2.—Monthly TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) exits in Florida by
reason for exit, January 2000–March 2004.

statistic is the percentage of cases closed due to sanctions. As the previous discussion noted, over the period of this study, approximately onethird of all case closings in Florida were due to sanctions. In contrast,
the most recent data reported by the federal government (for fiscal year
2002) show that only 7 percent of all case closings nationwide are due
to sanctions (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2004).
Recognizing the fact that such statistics are in part a function of the
number of nonsanction exits, Pavetti and associates (2004) recommend
a purer measure of sanctioning that is based on the cumulative incidence
of sanctioning for a panel of clients over a significant period of time.
Using this method, Pavetti and associates (2004) measure the sanction
rate in three states (Illinois, New Jersey, and South Carolina) that use
immediate, full-family sanctions. Among those in the cohort of adult
TANF recipients who entered TANF in November of 2001, after 18
months, 13 percent of the New Jersey cohort and 17 percent of the
Illinois cohort were sanctioned. In South Carolina, clients could only
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be observed for 10 months. In this period, 5 percent of clients were
ultimately sanctioned. Comparable sanctioning rates in Florida are estimated by relying on the same panel method used by Pavetti and colleagues (2004). Results are presented for the cohort of Florida’s adult
TANF recipients who entered TANF in November 2001. These indicate
that, after 10 months, 43 percent of the cohort was sanctioned at least
once. After 18 months, 47 percent was sanctioned. There is thus good
reason to believe that Florida is among the leaders in the use of sanctions.
Local Variation in Sanctioning
To test for county variation in Florida’s decentralized TANF system,
county sanction rates are calculated using a method similar to the panel
method advocated by Pavetti and associates (2004). However a few modifications are incorporated. First, rather than focusing on one specific
cohort, the study observes sanctioning outcomes for the 24 cohorts
entering TANF from January 2001 through December 2002. Second,
within each cohort, observation is limited to new TANF clients; that is,
the study observes clients who did not receive TANF for a minimum of
12 consecutive months prior to entering TANF. Third, the focus lies
only on the first TANF spell for each cohort; a spell is defined as continuous months of TANF receipt. Finally, each cohort is examined for
a maximum of 12 consecutive months. A county’s sanction rate is calculated by first estimating the sanction rate for each cohort. This rate
is the percentage of the cohort that exited TANF due to a sanction.
The average sanction rate across the 24 cohorts is thus calculated to
arrive at a final county sanction rate for each of the 66 counties in the
data set.
These calculations result in a mean sanction rate of 39 percent across
all 66 counties; for the 24 cohorts of new TANF clients entering TANF
in 2001 and 2002, at least 39 percent were sanctioned off TANF during
their first TANF spell.9 Figure 3, which displays county sanction rates
for the upper and lower quartiles of the county distribution, indicates
that there is much variation in county sanction rates during the study
period. The figure shows that five counties display a sanction rate of
less than 30 percent; Hamilton County exhibits the lowest sanction rate
(22 percent) in the sample. In contrast, three counties sanctioned at a
rate of at least 50 percent, with Okeechobee County displaying the
highest sanction rate of all counties at 53 percent. Thus, the maximum
sanction rate in this study’s sample exceeded the minimum sanction
rate by 141 percent. These differences are both statistically and substantively significant. They suggest that sanction implementation is carried out in fundamentally different ways across the state.
A preliminary test of the influence of the political environment on

Fig. 3.—Florida counties and sanction rates
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Fig. 4.—Relationship between county sanction rate and local conservatism

sanction rates is provided by examining the bivariate relationship between the local sanction rates presented in figure 3 and the index of
county conservatism. This relationship, displayed in the form of a scatterplot in figure 4, provides some initial evidence of a modest relationship between local sanctioning outcomes and the political environment.
This relationship is confirmed by the estimated regression line (b p
8.0, p p .03), which is also plotted in the figure. Despite statistical significance, this relationship is clearly far from perfect and suggests that
many other factors influence sanctioning outcomes. A more detailed
and rigorous multivariate analysis of sanctioning is warranted.
An Event History Model of Sanction Initiation
The event history analysis uses individual-level administrative data on
TANF adults. These data are provided by the Florida DCF. They are
supplemented with data on county political and socioeconomic characteristics. The sample consists of all new adult clients entering TANF
during the 24-month period from January 2001 through December
2002.10 Thus, the entire period of analysis extends from January 2001
(first cohort enters) through November 2003 (twelfth month of spell
for last cohort). The dependent variable is dichotomous, taking on a
value of one in the month that a client is sanctioned. Each member of
the 24 cohorts is followed for a maximum of 12 consecutive months or
until a sanction (whichever comes first). Clients who exit for reasons
other than sanction, or who are not sanctioned by the twelfth month
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of the spell, are treated as right censored. For the purposes of this article,
attention is restricted to each individual’s first TANF spell during this
period. A spell is defined as continuous months of TANF receipt. As a
result of this definition and the elimination of a small percentage of
cases for which data are missing, the total sample includes 60,045 individuals; this results in 169,438 person-month observations.
Estimates rely on the Cox proportional hazards model. This model
allows for flexible, nonparametric estimation of the baseline hazard, or
what one might think of as the effect of spell duration on the probability
of sanction (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).11 For each of the variables in the model, the estimated hazard ratio is reported. This reflects
the proportional change in the risk of sanction given a 1-unit increase
in the independent variable of interest.
The results for the event history analysis are presented in four alternative specifications, which are listed in models 1–4 of table 1.12 Attention for the moment is limited to model 1, which is restricted to the
effects of individual-level variables. Much as one would expect, sanctions
are significantly related to various client traits. Specifically, TANF sanctions are significantly more likely to be applied to the small number of
men in the program, relative to the large majority of adult women in
the program. The probability of being sanctioned is negatively associated
with the age of the client but positively associated with the ages of the
children, higher for clients from two-parent families than for single
parents, and negatively associated with human capital (as measured by
wage income and education). These results are largely consistent with
the findings of past studies (Born et al. 1999; Koralek 2000; Westra and
Routely 2000; Mancuso and Lindler 2001; Hasenfeld et al. 2002; Kalil
et al. 2002; Keiser et al. 2004; Wu et al. 2006). In addition, these relationships are largely consistent across the alternative specifications presented in table 1.
The effects of race and ethnicity are complicated; model diagnostics
determined that these effects vary in magnitude across the TANF spell.13
This is especially noteworthy because, according to state officials, sanctions in the first month of a spell often result if clients register for the
program and then drop out without participating. These sanctions are
in effect self-imposed. Sanctions in subsequent months are initiated by
caseworkers and imposed on clients who have been participating in the
program. Models accordingly include multiplicative terms that multiply
the race or ethnicity of the client and a simple counter variable (1–12)
that represents the month of the TANF spell (e.g., black # month of
spell, Hispanic # month of spell). The table presents results for the
third, sixth, and ninth months of spells. Results suggest that, in the
earliest months of a participation spell, white clients are significantly
more likely to be sanctioned than are black or Hispanic clients. However,
as the length of the spell grows, black and Hispanic clients become
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more likely than their white counterparts to experience a sanction
(among Hispanic clients, the difference at the sixth and ninth month
of the spell is not statistically significant). By the ninth month of the
spell, black clients are predicted to be sanctioned at a rate that is anywhere from 22 to 35 percent higher than that for whites (depending
upon model specification). The interaction of race and ethnicity with
month of spell is extremely robust and underscores the importance of
employing a longitudinal design, such as event history analysis, to study
racial dynamics in TANF sanctioning.
The estimated effects of the local political climate are reflected in
models 2–4. Model 2, which adds the local conservatism index to the
specification presented in model 1, indicates that the risk of sanction
is significantly higher in conservative counties than in liberal ones. The
hazard ratio suggests that if individual traits are held constant, the risk
of sanction in the most conservative county is 67 percent higher than
that in the most liberal county. Model 3 adds the other contextual
variables to the specification. The results suggest that local political
ideology is still significantly related to sanctioning, although the estimated effect diminishes to some degree. Finally, model 4 reflects the
same specification as model 3 but drops Dade County from the sample
as a test of robustness. Dade County is by far the largest represented
county. It includes 14 percent of all TANF clients and 16 percent of all
person-month observations in the estimation sample. In many respects,
Dade County is atypical among Florida’s counties. Its population is racially mixed, and TANF services are delivered by a variety of different
types of agencies (i.e., public, private, and nonprofit). Overall, the results for model 4 are very similar to those for model 3. This suggests
that the inclusion of Dade County in the sample does not bias the overall
findings. In fact, the effect of local political ideology is somewhat stronger when Dade County is removed from the sample.
Although the results presented in table 1 suggest that the effect of
local political ideology is statistically as well as substantively significant,
an important weakness of the hazard ratio is that it is limited to describing the relative risk of sanction at a single point in time (i.e., at a
given month within the TANF spell). Further perspective on the magnitude of this effect thus is provided in figure 5, which examines the
cumulative effect of local political ideology over the course of the entire
TANF spell. Figure 5 plots cumulative survival rates for a typical TANF
client, estimating them in two contexts (the most liberal county and
the most conservative county). The figure estimates survival functions
for a 31-year-old single white woman who has one child (aged 3–4 years),
12 years of education, and an average level of wage income in the quarter
preceding the observed month. These estimates are based on the results
presented for model 2 of table 1. The survival curves indicate that in a
conservative county, the client’s probability of surviving on welfare
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Individual characteristics:
Gender (male)
Age
Marital status (single parent)
Number of children (reference p none or one):
Two
Three or more
Age of youngest child (reference p 0–2 months):
3 months–2 years
3–4 years
5–12 years
More than 12 years
Wage income
Education (reference p more than HS):
Less than HS
HS
Race or ethnicity (reference p white, non-Hispanic):
Black:
Third month of TANF spell
Sixth month of TANF spell
Ninth month of TANF spell

Independent Variable

1.185**
.979**
.879**
.998
1.018
3.883**
3.773**
4.092**
4.391**
.984**
1.447**
1.118**
.954
1.112**
1.297**

1.004
1.032
3.875**
3.759**
4.092**
4.404**
.982**
1.438**
1.113**
.884*
1.023
1.182*

Model 2

1.196**
.979**
.895**

Model 1

.964
1.125**
1.313**

1.448**
1.127**

3.884**
3.796**
4.113**
4.432**
.986**

.993
1.013

1.180**
.980**
.858**

Model 3

.968
1.124**
1.305**

1.432**
1.118**

4.093**
3.988**
4.331**
4.743**
.986**

.994
1.017

1.163**
.980**
.838**

Model 4

Cox Proportional Hazard Models of Effect of Individual and Community-Level Characteristics on Sanction Initiation
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305

…
…
…
…
…
60,045
23,568
169,438

…
…
…

.767**
.860
.964

…
…
…
…
…
60,045
23,568
169,438

1.674**
…
…

.851*
.961
1.084

.971
1.011
1.039**
1.287**
.840**
60,045
23,568
169,438

1.435**
.996
.991**

.913**
1.033
1.169

.960
1.007
1.043**
1.358**
.858**
51,685
21,047
141,966

1.666**
.995
.996

.900**
1.057
1.241

Note.—HS p high school education; TANF p Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. The sample for this analysis consists of all new clients who
entered TANF from January 2001 through December 2002. All clients are observed for a maximum of 12 months (clients who exit without being
sanctioned, or who were sanctioned after 12 months, are treated as censored). Cell entries are hazard ratios, and p-values are based on robust standard
errors (adjusted for error clustering at the county level).
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.

Hispanic:
Third month of TANF spell
Sixth month of TANF spell
Ninth month of TANF spell
Political environment:
County conservatism index
County black population (%)
County Hispanic population (%)
Socioeconomic environment:
Annual wage in food service and drinking places
County unemployment rate (t ⫺ 1)
County poverty rate
County population (millions)
County TANF caseload (t ⫺ 1)
Number of subjects
Number of failures
Time at risk (person-months)
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Fig. 5.—Estimated cumulative survival function for a typical TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) adult, by local political ideology. Survival functions are estimated
for a 31-year-old single white woman with one child (aged 3–4 years), 12 years of education,
and an average level of wage income in the previous quarter. These estimates are based
on the results presented in model 2 of table 1.

through the twelfth month of a TANF spell without a sanction is approximately 0.20. In contrast, the probability that the same (hypothetical) client will survive through the twelfth month without a sanction
in the most liberal county is twice the probability of that for living in a
conservative county, approximately 0.40. Of course, very few clients in
Florida experience 12-month TANF spells, but this simulation does provide additional perspective on the substantive effect of local political
ideology on sanctioning outcomes.
The estimated effects of the local racial or ethnic context on sanctions
provide some evidence that sanctioning is lower in areas with a large
minority population than it is in areas with relatively smaller minority
populations. This provides possible support for the notion that racial
and ethnic minorities are able to exert influence over TANF policy
outcomes. But the data do not enable a determination of whether this
estimated relationship is due to indirect pressure that members of minority populations exert on TANF officials or to representation of members of these populations among case managers and TANF administrators. The coefficient for percentage of the county population that is
Hispanic reaches statistical significance in model 3. However, if Dade
County is dropped from the sample, this coefficient falls just below the
threshold for significance. The coefficient for the percentage of the
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county population that is black is consistently negative. It does not reach
the 0.05 threshold for statistical significance in any specification, but it
consistently comes close to significance in each model of table 1 (.10 !
p ! .20, two-tailed).
The results in table 1 suggest that sanctioning outcomes are also
influenced by the socioeconomic environment in which TANF is implemented. If all other factors are equal, the risk of sanction is estimated
to be greater in large urban counties than in smaller nonurban counterparts. The higher risk may be related to the relatively higher rates
of poverty. These results may reflect the effects of environments in which
jobs are scarce. They may also stem from other reasons specific to the
local environment. Such local factors may make it difficult for TANF
clients to meet the demands of the program. It is interesting to note
that the size of the TANF caseload is negatively related to sanctioning.
This lends some support to the possibility that case managers with heavy
caseloads have limited time to spend monitoring their clients or that they
find it difficult to follow through with the administrative burden of the
sanction process. Contrary to expectations, there are relatively weak estimated effects of two aspects of local labor markets; neither unemployment rates nor local wage levels prove to be a statistically significant
predictor of sanctions.

Conclusion
Within the TANF program, sanction policies are a key tool for signaling
to clients that they must take seriously the welfare-to-work philosophy
and the slate of obligations it imposes. If clients do not meet their
obligations, they lose access to cash assistance. Because sanctioning has
important implications for clients’ well-being, a number of studies examine the determinants of sanctioning. Although these studies further
understanding, they are almost exclusively client-centered in theoretical
approach, neglecting to consider other factors, including the role of
local political ideology in conditioning the implementation of sanction
policies. The current analysis examines local variation in sanctioning
across the state of Florida, which is an innovator among states in developing a decentralized system for administering welfare reform. Three
findings seem to merit special attention.
First, several studies show that the discretion granted to states through
first-order devolution is used to tailor state welfare programs to the
ideological tastes of their citizens (e.g., Soss et al. 2001; Fellowes and
Rowe 2004). Welfare reform, however, also is characterized by secondorder devolution, which increases the importance of local discretion in
welfare reform outcomes. The current analysis suggests that, at least in
one state, second-order devolution may indeed further allow policies to
be shaped by ideology. The analysis of sanctioning presented in Florida
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thus shows that there is much variation in local sanctioning practices;
this variation persists even after controlling for individual client traits.
More important, there is strong evidence that local differences are tied
to local political values. The causal mechanism that drives this finding
is not clear; however, there is good reason to believe it is rooted in the
decentralized nature of the state’s TANF implementation. Under this
system, there is a potential for local policy makers, agency managers,
and case managers to exercise influence over the implementation of
sanctions above and beyond the influence they could exert under a less
decentralized system. To the extent that local political ideology does in
fact shape local implementation decisions, this finding raises important
questions about decentralization’s potential effectiveness in achieving
the goals of welfare reform (Cho et al. 2005).
A second important finding is that social class influences sanctioning
outcomes. This study is consistent with prior research in finding that
individuals with low levels of human capital (as indicated by low education and income levels) are associated with being sanctioned. There
also is evidence that class exhibits a contextual effect, in that the probability of sanction is high among clients who live in poverty-stricken
areas. As many of the most disadvantaged TANF clients are likely to live
in areas characterized by a high concentration of poverty, this finding
suggests that many poor families may be doubly disadvantaged in their
efforts to comply with the demands placed upon them by the welfare
system.
Finally, the findings concerning the relationship between race and
sanctioning suggest that the phenomenon of racial disparities may be
more complex than has been thus far understood. This complexity is
demonstrated by two sets of findings. First, both the magnitude and the
direction of racial disparity in sanctioning are strongly related to the
duration of the TANF spell. This time dependency is most evident in
examining black-white disparities but can also be seen to some extent
in examining Hispanic-white disparities. Second, the magnitude of racial
disparities increases if one controls for community characteristics. Together, these findings highlight the importance of using a methodological approach to studying sanctions that relies on an event history
design and also considers the effects of the local implementation environment.
In conclusion, these findings raise questions about the prevailing tendency to interpret cross-client variation in the probability of being sanctioned as a product of individual-level differences, independent of contextual factors such as the political environment. The evidence presented
in this study suggests otherwise. For clients, the probability of being sanctioned is highly dependent upon whether welfare-to-work participation
is occurring in a liberal or conservative political environment. Sanction
implementation is not a politically neutral process, at least not in a state
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that decentralizes the administration of welfare. The political values that
prevail in local environments matter for the frequency and incidence of
sanctioning. When viewed alongside this study’s findings for human capital and client race, the political character of sanctioning should raise
significant concerns for scholars and policy makers alike.
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Table A1

Number of children (ref. p none or one):
Two
Three or more
Age of youngest child (ref. p 0–2 months):
3 months–2 years
3–4 years
5–12 years
More than 12 years
Wage income
Education (ref. p more than 12 years):
Less than HS
HS
Race or ethnicity (ref. p white, non-Hispanic):
Black
Hispanic

.303
.256
.365
.129
.276
.126
.552
.458
.348
.425
.176

1 p 3 months–2 years, 0 p otherwise
1 p 3–4 years, 0 p otherwise
1 p 5–12 years, 0 p otherwise
1 p more than 12 years, 0 p otherwise
Wage income from previous quarter, in 1,000s
1 p more than 12 years, 0 p otherwise
1 p 12 years, 0 p otherwise
1 p black, 0 p otherwise
1 p Hispanic, 0 p otherwise

.119
30.926
.811

Mean

1 p 2 children, 0 p otherwise
1 p 3 or more, 0 p otherwise

0 p female, 1 p male
Client age (in years)
1 p single parent, 0 p otherwise, based on
no. of adults in family

Definition

.494
.381

.498
.476

.482
.335
.447
.332
1.611

.460
.436

.325
8.706
.391

SD

Variable Definitions, Sources, and Descriptive Statistics for Analyses Presented in Table 1

Individual characteristics:*
Gender
Age
Marital status

Independent Variable

Appendix

0–1
0–1

0–1
0–1

0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–200

0–1
0–1

0–1
18–72
0–1

Min.–Max.
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Average annual income in 2002 for employees
in NAICS subsector 722, in 1,000s‡
Unemployment rate in county of client, measured each month§
County poverty rate for all persons in 2000k
Number of TANF recipients per 100,000
county residents (calculated by authors)
Total county population in 2000, in millions†

See table A2
Percentage of blacks in county of client in
2000†
Percentage of Hispanics in county of client in
2000†

.893

12.545
2.092

5.286

12.556

17.593

.465
15.495

.745

3.289
1.083

1.625

1.868

18.634

.220
7.351

.007–2.253

6.9–24.2
.142–6.907

1.7–19.7

7.795–16.674

1.5–57.3

0–1
2.1–57.1

Note.—Ref. p reference category; HS p high school education; TANF p Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; NAICS p North American
Industry Classification System.
* Data on client characteristics were provided by the Florida Department of Children and Families.
†
Data from U.S. Census Bureau 2001.
‡
Data from Florida Agency for Workforce Innovation n.d.b.
§
Data from Florida Agency for Workforce Innovation n.d.a.
k
Data from U.S. Census Bureau n.d.

County population (millions)

County poverty rate
County TANF caseload (t ⫺ 1)

County unemployment rate (t ⫺ 1)

Socioeconomic environment:
Annual wage in food service and drinking
places

County Hispanic population (%)

Political environment:
County conservatism index
County black population (%)

Table A2
Construction of Index of County Political Ideology

Ballot Title
Should Two-Thirds Vote be Required for
New Constitutionally-Imposed State
Taxes/Fees?
Fee on Everglades Sugar Production
Responsibility for Paying Costs for Water
Pollution Abatement in the Everglades
Preservation of the Death Penalty: United
States Supreme Court Interpretation of
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Additional Homestead Tax Exemption
Public Education of Children
Basic Rights
Ballot Access, Public Campaign Financing,
and Election Process Revisions

Firearms Purchases: Local Option for Criminal History Records Check and Waiting
Period
Florida Transportation Initiative for Statewide High Speed Monorail, Fixed Guideway of Magnetic Levitation System
Protect People from the Health Hazards of
Second-Hand Tobacco Smoke by Prohibiting Workplace Smoking
Voluntary Universal Pre-kindergarten
Education
Florida’s Amendment to Reduce Class Size
Animal Cruelty Amendment: Limiting Cruel
and Inhumane Confinement of Pigs during Pregnancy
Parental Notification of a Minor’s Termination of Pregnancy
Florida Minimum Wage Amendment
The Medical Liability Claimant’s Compensation Amendment
Authorizes Miami-Dade and Broward
County Voters to Approve Slot Machines
in Parimutuel Facilities

To Amend
Florida State
Constitution

Election
Year

Ballot
Number

1996
1996

Con. Am. 1
Con. Am. 4

Art. XI, sec. 7
Art. VII, sec. 9

1996

Con. Am. 5

Art. II, sec. 7

1998
1998
1998
1998

Con.
Con.
Con.
Con.

Art.
Art.
Art.
Art.

1998

Con. Am. 11 Art. IV, sec. 5a;
Art. VI, secs.
1, 2, 5, 7; Art.
IX, sec. 4a

1998

Con. Am. 12 Art. VIII, sec. 5

2000

Con. Am. 1

Art. X, sec. 19

2002

Con. Am. 6

Art. X, sec. 20

2002
2002

Con. Am. 8
Con. Am. 9

Art. IX, sec. 1
Art. IX, sec. 1

2002

Con. Am. 10 Art. X, sec. 19

2004
2004

Con. Am. 1
Con. Am. 5

Art. X, sec. 22
Art. X

2004

Con. Am. 3

Art. I, sec. 26

2004

Con. Am. 4

Art. X, sec. 19

Am.
Am.
Am.
Am.

2
3
6
9

I, sec. 17
VII, sec. 6
IX, sec. 1
I, sec. 2

Note.—Con. Am. p constitutional amendment. The index of local ideology is constructed from data on 18 ideologically relevant constitutional amendments that appeared
on Florida’s statewide ballot for ratification at some point from 1996 through 2004. The
percentage of votes in favor of each amendment is computed for each county. A factor
analysis is then conducted using all 18 amendments (thus 18 variables, N p 67 counties).
The amendments are identified in the table.
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1. Exemptions for good cause vary across the states but typically include illness, the
need to care for a sick family member, and lack of child care (Pavetti et al. 2004).
2. Administrative data for Glades County are unavailable.
3. Detailed variable descriptions, including data sources and descriptive statistics for
each variable used, are provided in appendix table A1.
4. Florida classifies a very small percentage (less than 2 percent) of clients’ race as
“other.” These individuals are omitted from the sample. Analysis is restricted to citizens
due to the unique challenges faced by noncitizens on TANF.
5. A list of the subjects of these amendments is presented in table A2.
6. The measure of the Republican vote share is the two-party vote share in the presidential elections of 1996, 2000, and 2004.
7. The surveys used to create these scores were the Florida Voter Panel Study conducted
in 1999 (Kane 2004) and a CBS News/New York Times survey of Florida voters conducted
in 2000 (CBS News/New York Times 2002). The average sample size for the eight counties
used in this analysis is 95.
8. This study examines wages for workers in food service and drinking establishments
because these jobs are common among the unskilled workers, mostly women, who rely
on public assistance.
9. As these calculations are based on a maximum spell of 12 months, the first spell
sanction rate is underestimated to the extent that clients were sanctioned after 12 months.
However, results indicate that spells of more than 12 consecutive months are extremely
rare in Florida.
10. This article defines “new” TANF clients as those clients who have spent at least 12
continuous months without TANF benefits.
11. The findings are replicated using other estimation methods as well, including parametric methods (Weibull) and a discrete-time (logit) model.
12. Given the multilevel character of the data, the p-values reported in table 1 are based
on standard errors that are adjusted for error correlation within counties.
13. Specifically, analyses examine the interaction of client race or ethnicity with alternative measures of the month of the TANF spell (linear, nonlinear, and dummy variable
versions). All analyses found a statistically significant interaction between race or ethnicity
of client and month of spell. For the sake of parsimony, the results report an interaction
between race or ethnicity of client and a linear version of the month of the TANF spell.

